(Maher 2012) introduced an approach for relative expressiveness of defeasible logics, and two notions of relative expressiveness were investigated. Using the first of these definitions of relative expressiveness, we show that all the defeasible logics in the DL framework are equally expressive under this formulation of relative expressiveness. The second formulation of relative expressiveness is stronger than the first. However, we show that logics incorporating individual defeat are equally expressive as the corresponding logics with team defeat. Thus the only differences in expressiveness of logics in DL arise from differences in how ambiguity is handled. This completes the study of relative expressiveness in DL begun in (Maher 2012).
Introduction
Defeasible logics provide several linguistic features to support the expression of defeasible knowledge. There are also a variety of such logics, supporting different intuitions about reasoning in a defeasible setting. The DL framework (Antoniou et al. 2000; Billington et al. 2010) provides logics that allow ambiguity in the "truth" status of a literal to propagate, and logics that block ambiguity; it has logics that require an individual rule to defeat all competitors, and logics that allow a "team" of rules to defeat competitors. Given the different inferences supported by the different logics, it is interesting to determine whether these logics are equally powerful or whether, perhaps, some are more powerful than the others.
In terms of inference strength, (Billington et al. 2010) established the relationship between the different logics of DL. In terms of computational complexity, the logics of DL are equivalent: all have linear complexity (Maher 2001; Billington et al. 2010 ). Relative expressiveness of the different logics was first investigated in (Maher 2012) , which developed a framework, based on simulation in the presence of additional elements. Two notions of relative expressiveness within this framework were investigated: polynomial simulation wrt the addition of facts, and simulation wrt the addition of rules.
In this paper we continue this investigation. We will see that all the logics of DL are equally expressive, using the first notion of relative expressiveness. Thus we cannot distinguish the logics based on this notion. We also establish that individual defeat has equal expressiveness to team defeat in the logics of DL wrt addition of rules. This is somewhat surprising, given the apparent greater sophistication of the team defeat inference rules. Given results in (Maher 2012) , this completes the study of relative expressiveness for DL.
The next two sections summarize the DL framework of defeasible logics and the notions of relative expressiveness introduced in (Maher 2012) . Then the following two sections together provide the proof that the logics of DL are of equal expressivity (in terms of simulation wrt addition of facts). The first shows the simulation of an ambiguity propagating logic by an ambiguity blocking logic, while the second shows a simulation in the reverse direction. Combined with results of (Maher 2012) , this establishes that the logics in DL all have the same expressiveness in this formulation.
The following sections investigate relative expressiveness via the second, stronger formulation. Adapting simulations of (Maher 2012) to the stronger formulation, we establish that individual defeat has equal expressiveness to team defeat in the logics of DL. Proofs of the results in this paper are detailed and lengthy. They appear in an appendix.
Defeasible Logic
In this section we can only present an outline of the defeasible logics we investigate. Further details can be obtained from (Billington et al. 2010 ) and the references therein. We address propositional defeasible logics, but the results should extend to a first-order language.
A defeasible theory is built from a language Σ of literals (which we assume is closed under negation) and a language Λ of labels. A defeasible theory D = (F, R, >) consists of a set of facts F , a finite set of rules R, each rule with a distinct label from Λ, and an acyclic relation > on Λ called the superiority relation. This syntax is uniform for all the logics considered here. Facts are individual literals expressing indisputable truths. Rules relate a set of literals (the body), via an arrow, to a literal (the head), and are one of three types: a strict rule, with arrow →; a defeasible rule, with arrow ⇒; or a defeater, with arrow ;. Strict rules represent inferences that are unequivocally sound if based on definite knowledge; defeasible rules represent inferences that are generally sound. Inferences suggested by a defeasible rule may fail, due to the presence in the theory of other rules. Defeaters do not support inferences, but may impede inferences suggested by other rules. The superiority relation provides a local priority on rules. Strict or defeasible rules whose bodies are established defeasibly represent claims for the head of the rule to be concluded. The superiority relation contributes to the adjudication of these claims by an inference rule, leading (possibly) to a conclusion. Given a theory D, the corresponding languages are expressed by Σ(D) and Λ(D).
Defeasible logics derive conclusions that are outside the syntax of the theories. Conclusions may have the form +dq, which denotes that under the inference rule d the literal q can be concluded, or −dq, which denotes that the logic can establish that under the inference rule d the literal q cannot be concluded. The syntactic element d is called a tag. In general, neither conclusion may be derivable: q cannot be concluded under d, but the logic is unable to establish that. Tags +∆ and −∆ represent monotonic provability (and unprovability) where inference is based on facts, strict rules, and modus ponens. We assume these tags and their inference rules are present in every defeasible logic. What distinguishes a logic is the inference rule for defeasible reasoning. The four logics discussed in the Introduction correspond to four different pairs of inference rules, labelled ∂, δ, ∂ * , and δ * ; they produce conclusions of the form (respectively) +∂q, −∂q, +δq, −δq, etc. The inference rules δ and δ * require auxiliary tags and inference rules, denoted by σ and σ * , respectively. For each of the four principal defeasible tags d, the corresponding logic is denoted by DL(d).
The four principal tags and corresponding inference rules represent different intuitions about defeasible reasoning: in ∂ and ∂ * ambiguity is blocked, while in δ and δ * ambiguity is propagated; in ∂ and δ rules for a literal act as a team to overcome competing rules, while in ∂ * and δ * a single rule must overcome all competing rules. A more detailed discussion of ambiguity and team defeat in the DL framework is given in (Billington et al. 2010) and (Maher 2012) . The inference rules are presented in the appendix in the form of the definition of a function T D for a given theory D. Given a defeasible theory D, for any set of conclusions E, T D (E) denotes the set of conclusions inferred from E using D and one application of an inference rule. T D is a monotonic function on the complete lattice of sets of conclusions ordered by containment. The least fixedpoint of T D is the set of all conclusions that can be drawn from D. We follow standard notation in that
The relative inference strength of the different logics in DL was established in the inclusion theorem of (Billington et al. 2010) . For any tag d, +d(D) denotes the set of conclusions of D of the form +dq and similarly for −d.
Theorem 1 (Inclusion Theorem (Billington et al. 2010) ) Let D be a defeasible theory.
Parts (a) and (b) are proved in (Billington et al. 2010) . Parts (c) and (d) can be established by similar methods.
Simulating Defeasible Logics
(Maher 2012) introduced a framework for addressing the relative expressiveness of defeasible logics. The framework identifies the greater (or equal) expressiveness of L 2 compared to L 1 with the ability to simulate any theory D in a logic L 1 by a theory T (D) in the logic L 2 . Simple simulation was shown not to be sufficiently discriminating, so simulation was required to hold in the presence of an addition to the theory. The addition of a theory A to a theory D is denoted by D + A. Addition is essentially the union of the theories, but we require Λ(D) ∩ Λ(A) = ∅, so that the addition of theories preserves the property that distinct rules have distinct labels. This requirement also has the effect that a superiority statement in D cannot affect a rule in A, and vice versa. Let D = (F, R, >) and
A simulating theory T (D) in general will involve additional literals, rules and labels beyond those of D. If additions A were permitted to affect these, the notion of simulation would become trivial, so we restrict additions to have only an indirect effect on T (D), via Σ(D). Given a theory D and a possible simulating theory T (D), we say an addition A is modular if
In general, we will consider a class of additions but for any D and T (D) only the modular additions in the class will be considered.
Since different logics involve different tags, conclusions from theories in different logics cannot be identical. For simulation it suffices that conclusions are equal modulo tags. Given logics L 1 and L 2 , with principal tags d 1 and d 2 , respectively, we say two conclusions α in L 1 and β in L 2 are equal modulo tags if α is +d 1 q and β is +d 2 q or α is −d 1 q and β is −d 2 q.
Thus we have the following definition of simulation and relative expressiveness. For more discussion on the motivations for the definitions, see (Maher 2012) .
Definition 2 Let C be a class of defeasible theories.
We say D 1 in logic L 1 is simulated by D 2 in L 2 with respect to a class C if, for every modular addition A in C, D 1 + A and D 2 + A have the same conclusions in Σ(D 1 + A), modulo tags.
We say a logic L 1 can be simulated by a logic L 2 with respect to a class C if every theory in L 1 can be simulated by some theory in L 2 with respect to additions from C.
We say L 2 is more (or equal) expressive than L 1 if L 1 can be simulated by L 2 with respect C.
Different notions of relative expressiveness arise from different choices for C. There were two classes of additions investigated in (Maher 2012) : the addition of facts (that is, A has the form (F, ∅, ∅)), and the addition of rules (that is, A has the form (∅, R, ∅)). Simulation with respect to addition of rules is stronger than simulation with respect to addition of facts because any fact can equally be expressed as a strict rule with an empty body. We might also consider arbitrary additions, where A can be any defeasible theory.
The main results of (Maher 2012) are that:
• DL(∂) and DL(∂ * ) have equal expressiveness, with respect to addition of facts, as do DL(δ) and DL(δ * )
• neither DL(∂) nor DL(∂ * ) is more expressive than DL(δ) or DL(δ * ), and vice versa, with respect to addition of rules • when arbitrary additions are permitted, of the four defeasible logics under consideration, none is more expressive than any other
Blocked Ambiguity Simulates Propagated Ambiguity
We now show that every theory over an ambiguity propagating logic can be simulated by a theory over the corresponding ambiguity blocking logic. To begin, we show that DL(∂ * ) can simulate DL(δ * ). Any defeasible theory D is transformed into a new theory. The new theory employs new propositions strict(q) and supp(q), for each literal q, and supp body(r), comp(r), and o(r), for each rule r. The new theory also introduces labels p d (r), n d (r, s), p s (r), n s (r, s), for each pair r, s of opposing rules in D. These are families of propositions and labels, not predicates, despite the notation.
Definition 3
Let D = (F, R, >) be a defeasible theory with language Σ. We define the transformation T of D to T (D) = (F , R , > ) as follows:
1. The facts of T (D) are the facts of D. That is, F = F . 2. Every strict rule of R is included in R . 3. For every literal q, R contains
and the superiority relation contains nstr(q) > str(q), for every q. and, further, for each rule s = B s → s ∼q for ∼q in R, where s > r, R contains
⇒ ¬o(r) and the superiority relation contains n s (s, r) > p s (s). 6. For each strict or defeasible rule r = B r → r q in R, R contains inf (r) : B r , ¬comp(r), ¬strict(∼q) ⇒ q and, further, for each rule s = B s → s ∼q for ∼q in R, where s < r, R contains
⇒ ¬comp(r) and the superiority relation contains
Parts 1 and 2 of the transformation preserve all the strict inferences from D. Part 3 allows us to distinguish strict conclusions from defeasible conclusions. The structure of these rules -where str(q) is strict, nstr(q) is defeasible, and nstr(q) > str(q) -ensures that strict(q) is inferred defeasibly iff q is inferred strictly, and strict(q) fails iff strict inference of q fails. A similar structure of rules was previously used in (Maher 2012) in showing that DL(∂ * ) can simulate DL(∂) wrt addition of facts.
We use the proposition supp(q) to indicate that the literal q is supported (i.e. +σ * q can be inferred), while the literal q refers to defeasible provability (wrt δ * ). Part 4 ensures that every literal that holds defeasibly is also supported. This property is justified by the inclusion theorem of (Billington et al. 2010) . Part 5 encodes the inference rules for support (i.e. σ * ). supp body(r) indicates that all literals in the body of rule r are supported. The head q of a rule r is supported if the body of r is supported and r is not overruled (i.e. all rules s that are superior to r fail). The overruling of r is indicated by o(r). The rules n s (r, s) and p s (r) and the superiority relation ensure that ¬o(r) is derived defeasibly iff there is no overruling rule s.
Rules inf (r) in part 6 encode the inference rules for δ * . q holds defeasibly iff the body of a rule r for q holds defeasibly and r has no competing rules (i.e. all rules for ∼q not inferior to r have a body that fails wrt σ * ). The rules n d (r, s) and p d (r) and the superiority relation ensure that ¬comp(r) is derived defeasibly iff there is no competing rule.
In this translation, the superiority relation in D is not directly represented by the superiority relation in T (D). Instead, the superiority relation in D is used to restrict the instantiation of rules in the transformation, while the superiority relation in T (D) is used to ensure that o(r) and ¬o(r) do not both fail, and similarly for comp(r).
Example 4
To see the operation of this transformation, consider the following theory D, which demonstrates the difference between ambiguity propagation and blocking logics. ⇒ supp body(r 1 ) supp body(r 1 ), ¬o(r 1 ) ⇒ supp(p) ⇒ supp body(r 2 ) supp body(r 2 ), ¬o(r 2 ) ⇒ supp(¬p) supp(¬p) ⇒ supp body(r 3 ) supp body(r 3 ), ¬o(r 3 ) ⇒ supp(¬q) ⇒ supp body(r 4 ) supp body(r 4 ), ¬o(r 4 ) ⇒ supp(q)
T (D) also contains the following superiority statements.
There are some points to highlight in this example. Rules for strict and ¬strict are omitted from the listing above because they are not of interest (D has no strict rules or facts); we will have conclusions +∂ * ¬strict(l) and −∂ * strict(l), for every literal l. There are no rules n s (r, s) in T (D) because they only occur when s > r, and the superiority relation in D is empty. Consequently, there are no superiority statements of the form n s (r, s) > p s (r). It also follows that +∂ * ¬o(r) is concluded, for each rule r, and hence we can infer +∂ * supp(l), for each literal l except ¬q, reflecting the fact that these literals are supported in D, and +∂ * supp body(r), for each rule r. We can then infer also +∂ * supp(¬q). It then follows that −∂ * ¬comp(r) is concluded, for each r, using the superiority relation. Then, as a consequence of the rules inf (r), we find that all literals l fail to be inferred (i.e. we conclude −∂ * l, for each literal l). This expresses the ambiguity propagating behaviour of DL(δ * ) from within DL(∂ * ).
Theorem 5
The ambiguity blocking logics (DL(∂) and DL(∂ * )) can simulate the ambiguity propagating logics (DL(δ) and DL(δ * )) with respect to addition of facts.
Propagated Ambiguity Simulates Blocked Ambiguity
We now show that every theory over an ambiguity blocking logic can be simulated by a theory over the corresponding ambiguity propagating logic. To begin, we simulate DL(∂ * ) by DL(δ * ). Any defeasible theory D is transformed into a new theory T (D). The new theory employs new propositions strict(q) and undefeated (q) for each literal q in Σ, and employs labels str(q) and nstr(q) for each literal q in Σ, and n d (r, s) and p d (r) for each pair of opposing rules r, s in R.
Definition 6
⇒ ¬true(q) and the superiority relation contains nstr(q) > str(q) and t(q) > nt(q), for every q.
For each literal q, R contains undefeated (q) ⇒ q
For each strict or defeasible rule r = B r → r q for q in R, R contains
and, further, for each rule s = B s → s ∼q for ∼q in R, where r > s, R contains
and the superiority relation contains n d (r, s) > p d (r).
Parts 1 and 2 preserve all the strict inferences from D. Part 3 allows us to distinguish strict conclusions from defeasible conclusions. For this transformation -compared to the transformation in the previous section -extra rules t and nt are needed. These rules ensure that δ * and σ * agree on the literals true(q), that is, from T (D)+A we conclude +δ * true(q) iff we conclude +σ * true(q) iff D+A +∆q. (See Lemma 18 in the appendix.) In comparison, we never infer −σ * ¬strict(q) and always infer +σ * ¬strict(q), independent of D.
1
Theorem 8
For d ∈ {δ, δ * , ∂}, DL(d) can simulate DL(∂ * ) with respect to addition of facts Combining Theorems 5 and 8 with results from (Maher 2012) , we see that all logics of the DL framework are equally expressive in terms of simulation wrt addition of facts.
Simulation of Individual Defeat wrt Addition of Rules
The following definition defining D = (F , R , < ) from D is repeated from (Maher 2012 ).
Definition 9
We add the following rules It was shown in (Maher 2012 ) that, using this transformation, DL(∂) simulates DL(∂ * ) and DL(δ) simulates DL(δ * ), wrt addition of facts. On the surface, it might appear that this result extends readily to addition wrt rules: since the added rules do not participate in the superiority relation of the combined theory, it might be expected that the difference between team defeat and individual defeat is irrelevant. However, that expectation is misleading. The following example shows that this transformation does not provide a simulation of DL(∂ * ) by DL(∂) wrt addition of rules.
Example 10
Let D consist of the rules
Then T (D) consists of the following rules
Now, let A be the rule ⇒ p Clearly, D + A −∂ * p (and D + A −∂ * ¬p), since r 2 cannot be overruled. However, T (D) + A −∂h(r 2 ), since n(r 2 , r 1 ) cannot be overruled, and hence s(r 2 ) fails. This leaves the rule for p in A without competition, and so T (D) + A +∂p.
A similar but more complex example (given in the appendix) shows the transformation also does not provide a simulation of DL(δ * ) by DL(δ) wrt addition of rules. These problems arise because if a rule body succeeds in D for each of q and ∼q, and the rules are not overruled, the simulation D has all bodies for q and ∼q failing. An applicable rule for q (or ∼q) in A thus has a competitor in D, but not in D . In this way D differs from D, and the examples show that addition of rules can make this difference observable.
To avoid these problems, we add extra rules to those in Definition 9.
Definition 11
We define T (D) as the theory (F , R , > ) consisting of the facts, rules and superiority statements from D in Definition 9, and the following. Parts 4 and 5 of this definition introduce an additional rule for each literal ∼q which, however, is subordinate to the methods to derive q in the original transformation in the sense that a derivation of q in the original transformation will overrule (part 6) a derivation of ∼q using part 4. The rules in part 4 are defeaters, so they cannot be used to derive any conclusions.
The effect of the extended definition on Example 10 is to add the following to the transformed theory:
We now have T (D) + A −∂p, since the rule o(¬p) provides a non-failed competitor to the rule in A. More generally, we find that, through the extended transformation, team defeat logics can simulate the corresponding individual defeat logics with respect to addition of rules.
Theorem 12
The logic DL(∂) can simulate DL(∂ * ) with respect to addition of rules. The logic DL(δ) can simulate DL(δ * ) with respect to addition of rules.
Simulation of Team Defeat wrt Addition of Rules
The same theory D and addition A as in Example 10 demonstrates that the simulation of DL(∂) by DL(∂ * ) wrt addition of facts exhibited in (Maher 2012) does not extend to addition of rules. The transformation below modifies the one of (Maher 2012) by treating strict rules differently (following Definition 6), adding a competitor for each literal q (following Definition 11), and employing separate defeasible rules to accommodate differences between the δ and σ inference rules. We use a construction to restrict one class of defeasible rules to use only in simulating σ inference; it is not necessary to restrict the other class because δ ⊆ σ, by the inclusion theorem.
Definition 13
We define the transformation T of D to T (D) = (F , R , > ) as follows:
⇒ ¬true(q) and the superiority relation contains nstr(q) > str(q) and t(q) > nt(q), for every q. 4. For each ordered pair of opposing rules r i = (B i → i ∼q) and r j = (B j → j q) in R, where r j is not a defeater, R contains
and R2 ij > R1 ij iff r j > r i , R3 ij > R1 ij for every i and j, and N F i > F i for every i.
If there is no strict or defeasible rule r j for q in D then only the last three rules appear in R , for each i. 5. For each literal q, and each strict or defeasible rule r = (B r → r q) in R, R contains
where s 1 , . . . , s k are the rules for ∼q 7. For each literal q and for each strict or defeasible rule r for q, R contains
where B r is the body of r, s 1 , . . . , s k are the rules for ∼q, and for every strict or defeasible rule r and opposing rule s, R contains a(s, r) :
The superiority relation contains a(s, r) > b(s, r) iff s > r. R also contains the rules Parts 1-3 allow us to characterize strict conclusions. Part 4 expresses whether a rule is defeated or not, while part 6 expresses that q can be concluded if there is an applicable strict or defeasible rule for q, all attempts to strictly derive ∼q fail finitely, and all opposing rules are defeated. While this expresses properly the inference rules for ∂ and δ, the inference rule for σ omits the condition on strict derivation of ∼q and has a slightly different form of defeat. We need part 7 to express inference (and defeat) for σ. g and ¬g are used to restrict the applicability of this rule to σ * ; we have T (D)+A +σ * g, but T (D)+A −∂ * g and T (D)+A −δ * g (and the same for ¬g). Parts 8 and 9 redress the lack of a competitor in the same way as in Definition 11.
Theorem 14
The logic DL(∂ * ) can simulate DL(∂) with respect to addition of rules. The logic DL(δ * ) can simulate DL(δ) with respect to addition of rules.
Conclusions
We have shown that the logics of the DL framework are equally expressive when relative expressiveness is formulated as ability to simulate in the presence of additional facts. This involved the introduction of two new transformations simulating, respectively, a logic that blocks ambiguity and a logic that propagates ambiguity. We also completed the study of relative expressiveness wrt addition of rules. Figure 1 shows this relation on the logics in DL, where an arrow from d 1 to d 2 expresses that DL(d 1 ) can be simulated by DL(d 2 ) with respect to the addition of rules. <> between tags expresses that the two corresponding logics have incomparable expressiveness. It is clear that DL breaks into two classes of logics of different expressiveness.
While the issue of relative expressiveness within the framework DL is now largely resolved, this same approach can be applied to relate these logics to other logics. We can expect the same results for the WFDL logics (Maher and Governatori 1999; Maher et al. 2011) , because of their similarity to DL, but their relation to the defeasible logics of Nute and Maier (Maier and Nute 2006; Maier and Nute 2010) will be of interest. Even more interesting will be to address other systems of defeasible reasoning, such as argumentation (Dung 1995; Rahwan and Simari 2009) .
